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Abstract
When a ﬁrm is able to recognize its previous customers, it may use information about
their purchase histories to price discriminate. We analyze a model with a monopolist and
a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers are able to maintain their
anonymity and avoid being identiﬁed as past customers, possibly at an (exogenous) cost.
When consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity, they all individually choose to
do so, which paradoxically results in the highest proﬁt for the ﬁrm. Increasing the cost of
anonymity can beneﬁt consumers, but only up to a point, after which the eﬀect is reversed.
Keywords: Privacy, anonymity, price discrimination, electronic commerce
JEL Classiﬁcations: L1, D8
1 Introduction
Perhaps the most important factor contributing to concerns about personal privacy is the po-
tential for discrimination. In an eﬀort to avoid diﬀerential treatment, individuals are typically
reluctant to disclose sensitive personal information such as income, family status, ethnic-
ity, race, or lifestyle. In recent years, revolutionary developments in information technology
regarding collection, storage, and retrieval of personal data have brought privacy to the fore-
front of public awareness and debate. This paper addresses a key component of the emergent
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concerns regarding electronic privacy, namely, the ability of ﬁrms to track individual pur-
chasing patterns and to use this information to practice behavior-based price discrimination
(Armstrong, 2006; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2006).
Records containing the sequence of web sites visited and the online purchases made by
individuals provide valuable clues about their personal information, clues that can be used to
target tailor-made oﬀers to them (Chen, 2006; Wathieu, 2006; Pancras and Sudhir, 2007; Chen
and Zhang, 2008). Such behavior-based advertising and price discrimination are already ubiq-
uitous in electronic commerce (Odlyzko, 2003; Hann et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the economic
impact of these practices is not fully understood. Presently, privacy practices in electronic
commerce are dictated largely by voluntary compliance with industry standards, recommen-
dations by regulatory agencies, and consumer concerns (FTC, 2007).
Although technology has allowed sellers to store and process consumers’ online activities
with relative ease, consumers do have some control over allowing sellers to record their indi-
vidual activities. For instance, they can exert eﬀort to understand sellers’ privacy disclosures
and take actions to circumvent being tracked. Such actions can include erasing or blocking
browser cookies, using a temporary email address, paying with a diﬀerent credit card, making
payments using a gift card acquired for cash in a brick-and-mortar store, and renting a postal
box. Examples of sellers discriminating based on past purchases include Comcast and Time
Warner oﬀering discounted packages that can be obtained only once per name and address,
AOL oﬀering special “new customer” accounts that can be opened only by revealing credit
card numbers that have not been applied before to a similar oﬀer, and credit report services
oﬀering once a year promotions tied to a consumer’s social security number. Perhaps the most
notorious example is the price discrimination ﬁasco of 2000 in which Amazon charged past
customers higher prices for DVDs that their purchase histories suggested they would be likely
to want.1 The key to these examples is that sellers have diﬃculty committing to future prices
and committing not to use information about past purchases.
The current set of guiding standards and recommendations (FTC, 2007) takes into account
a large variety of concerns, but appears to have little basis in formal economic theory or em-
pirical evidence. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the economic impacts of privacy
regulation, focusing speciﬁcally on consumer proﬁling and behavior-based price discrimina-
tion. We study a monopolist who is able to track (strategic) consumers’ purchases from the
ﬁrm. Consumers, however, are able to avoid being identiﬁed as past customers (or to “opt
1See, for instance, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/.
It is worth noting that Amazon still price discriminates by, for example, oﬀering past customers targeted
coupons. However, to our knowledge, it no longer shows (in a direct manner) diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent
consumers based on their past purchases.
2out”), possibly at a cost. We note that in our framework, a ﬁrm is likely to charge past cus-
tomers more than “new customers” because their past purchases signal a higher willingness
to pay (for tractability purposes we abstract from settings where the seller may want to give
discounts to past customers, for instance, due to diminishing marginal utility). We ﬁnd that
when consumers can costlessly opt out (and by doing so, maintain their anonymity), they all
individually choose to do so, which results in the highest proﬁt for the seller. We show that
increasing the cost of obtaining anonymity can beneﬁt consumers, but only up to a point; at
that point, the eﬀect is reversed.
The intuition for this paradoxical ﬁnding is closely related to the celebrated Coase Con-
jecture (Coase, 1972) and runs as follows. When the cost of maintaining anonymity is high,
the seller is better able to recognize past customers and to price discriminate against them.
Thus, consumers hesitate to make an initial purchase, knowing this will cause them to pay a
premium on future purchases. Anticipating this reluctance by consumers, the seller is forced
to oﬀer a lower initial price, and this eﬀect actually dominates the increase in proﬁts arising
from price discrimination in future periods. In other words, the seller would prefer to com-
mit itself not to price discriminate based on prior purchases. When the cost of maintaining
anonymity is low, consumers – in eﬀect – give the seller this commitment power when they
each rationally choose to keep their purchases private.
This paper is also related to work in the literatures on intertemporal price discrimination,
consumer recognition, and online privacy. Research on intertemporal price discrimination
and the “ratchet” eﬀect, where the ﬁrm sets higher prices for consumers who signaled higher
willingness to pay, dates back to the late 1970’s. Stokey (1979) and Salant (1989) show that
intertemporal price discrimination is never optimal for a monopolist who can commit to future
prices. This is analogous to the fact, mentioned above, that in our model, the monopolist
obtains its highest proﬁt when anonymity is costless. Villas-Boas (2004) shows that committing
to future prices can also help in a model with overlapping generations of consumers.
A relatively small literature on consumer recognition and online privacy has begun to de-
velop over the past several years.2 Early contributions by Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1998), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Villas-Boas (1999), Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000), Taylor
(2003), Chen and Zhang (2008), and Chen and Zhang (2009) introduced the notion of consumer
recognition and personalized pricing into economic theory, but did not explicitly consider pri-
vacy issues in online environments. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) explore what happens when
the ability to identify consumers varies across goods. They consider a model in which con-
2For a general discussion of price discrimination, see Stole (2007). For an economic analysis of privacy with
respect to lawful search and seizure, see Mialon and Mialon (2008).
3sumers can be anonymous or “semi-anonymous,” depending on the good bought. Villas-Boas
(1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) analyze a duopoly model in which consumers have a
choice between remaining loyal to a ﬁrm and defecting to the competitor, a phenomenon they
refer to as “consumer poaching.” Chen and Zhang (2008) analyze a “price for information”
strategy, where ﬁrms price less aggressively in order to learn more about their customers.
Chen and Zhang (2009) ﬁnd that price competition can be mitigated by ﬁrms vying to distin-
guish their loyal customers from price sensitive shoppers.
Closest to our work is an emerging literature on optimal online privacy policies. These were
ﬁrst studied by Taylor (2004), Acquisti and Varian (2005), and Calzolari and Pavan (2006).
Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Esteves (2010) oﬀer surveys of this literature. Taylor
(2004) and Villas-Boas (2004) show how strategic consumers could make a ﬁrm worse oﬀ
in the context of dynamic targeted pricing. Once consumers anticipate future prices, they
may choose to forgo a purchase today to avoid being identiﬁed as a past customer and thus
be able to purchase at a lower price targeted at new consumers. This strategic “waiting”
on the part of consumers can hurt a ﬁrm both through reducing sales and diminishing the
beneﬁt of price discrimination. Acquisti and Varian (2005) show that it is never proﬁtable
for a monopolist to condition its pricing on purchase history, unless a suﬃcient proportion
of consumers are not sophisticated enough to anticipate the ﬁrm’s pricing strategy or the
ﬁrm can provide enhanced services to increase consumer valuation in subsequent purchases.
Acquisti and Varian (2005) also begin to study consumers’ use of anonymizing technologies (so
as to circumvent identiﬁcation by a ﬁrm as a past customer) but do not fully study the welfare
implications. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) show that in a game with two sellers selling one after
the other, where buyers may have correlated valuations for their products, information trade
between the ﬁrst seller and the second seller will occur under some conditions and the eﬀects
of such information trade on welfare vary.
These papers provide important insights regarding the fundamental economic tensions be-
tween consumer privacy and price discrimination. This paper considers a richer environment,
in which a ﬁrm’s strategic customers can choose to remain anonymous at some cost. We study
how this cost aﬀects equilibrium behavior and welfare. Our model allows us to gain additional
insights into the eﬀects of tightening privacy regulation. In particular, we show that (putting
aside considerations about the intrinsic value of privacy and other non-price related privacy
concerns) while the ﬁrm obtains its highest proﬁt when consumers can costlessly maintain
their anonymity, consumers can, under some circumstances, be better oﬀ when maintaining
anonymity is costly, but only up to a point. Beyond that point, facilitating opting out (or
increasing privacy) beneﬁts consumers and increases overall welfare.
4This result is in contrast to the prior literature because it actually agrees with the common
intuition that more privacy can be better (even when consumers are strategic). Even more
surprising is that this welfare behavior happens in a region of opting-out costs where no con-
sumer chooses to opt out. In other words, we ﬁnd that added privacy can beneﬁt consumers
and increase overall surplus, even when no consumer decides to take advantage of it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 gives two benchmarks: when there is no customer recognition, and when there is no opting
out. The equilibrium of the game with opting out is derived in Section 4 along with comparative




There is a continuum of consumers with total mass normalized to one. All consumers are risk-
neutral, possess a common discount factor  2 0;1, and maximize their present expected
utilities. Each consumer demands at most one unit of a non-durable, indivisible good in each of
two periods. Consumer i’s valuation for the good is the same in each period and is determined
by the realization of a random variable vi with support normalized to be the unit interval.
Consumer valuations are independently and identically distributed according to a cumulative
distribution function Fv with density fv, which is strictly positive on 0;1. Consumer i’s
valuation vi is initially private information.
2.2 The firm
There is a monopolist that produces and sells the good in each period. The ﬁrm’s production
cost is normalized to zero, it possesses the same discount factor  as consumers, and it
maximizes its discounted expected proﬁt. It does not observe consumer valuations directly
but maintains a database containing purchasing histories. Each consumer is either anonymous
or identiﬁable. If a consumer is anonymous, then there is no record of any prior purchases by
her; i.e., she is not in the database. If she is identiﬁable, then in the second period the ﬁrm
knows the purchasing decision that she made in the ﬁrst period. We emphasize that the ﬁrm
has no commitment power, i.e., the ﬁrm is unable to set and commit to second-period prices
in the ﬁrst period. Because there is a continuum of consumers, each of them realizes that her
ﬁrst-period purchasing decision alone does not aﬀect the prices charged by the ﬁrm in the
5next period.3
2.3 The game
All aspects of the environment, including the distribution of valuations Fv, are common
knowledge. At the beginning of the game all consumers are anonymous. Hence, the ﬁrm oﬀers
the same ﬁrst-period price p1 to all of them. Next, each consumer decides whether to buy
the good in the ﬁrst period, qi
1  1, or not to buy it, qi
1  0. Consumers who elect to buy
the good also decide whether to let the ﬁrm keep a record of the transaction ri  1) or to
opt out and maintain anonymity by deleting the record of the sale ri  0). The cost to any
consumer who opts out is c  0,4 and we without loss of generality assume that this cost
is expended in the second period (i.e., it is discounted by ). This cost represents the time,
eﬀort, and any monetary expense of maintaining anonymity. We also allow consumers who
purchase to randomize between opting out and not opting out. A consumer who does not
purchase the good continues to be anonymous and is thus pooled with the buyers who opted
out, from the ﬁrm’s perspective. At the beginning of period two, the ﬁrm posts a price p0
2 to
the unidentiﬁed (anonymous) consumers and a price p1
2 to the identiﬁed ones.5 Consumers
can buy the good only at the price oﬀered to them, qi
2 2 f0;1g; i.e., no arbitrage is possible.
Hence, a consumer i with valuation vi who purchases in both periods has (present discounted)
utility vi  p1 vi  p1
2 if he does not opt out, and utility vi  p1 vi  p0
2  c if he does.
Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the game. We depict the extensive form of the game in
the appendix.
The solution concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE here consists
of the ﬁrm’s strategy (composed of ﬁrst-period price p1 and second-period prices p0
2 and
p1
2, corresponding to the ﬁrm’s two information sets in the second period6); the consumers’
strategies (composed of ﬁrst-period purchasing decisions qi
1 and opting-out decision ri 2
3The results hold when there is a ﬁnite number of consumers, provided that we add the following assumption:
the ﬁrm cannot update its beliefs over how many consumers opted out based on an inventory count. Without
this assumption, the ﬁrm could infer how many consumers opted out based on the inventory count. With a
continuum of (massless) consumers, inventory expectations on the equilibrium path are conﬁrmed even if a
single agent deviates.
4The qualitative nature of the results still holds under certain conditions when the cost of maintaining
anonymity varies across consumers, or when it is correlated with their valuations. In order to simplify the
analysis, we assume that consumers incur the same cost of maintaining their anonymity. See Taylor (2004) for
a model with correlated valuations, and Acquisti and Varian (2005) for a model with varying levels of consumer
sophistication.
5If the ﬁrm sets second-period prices before consumers decide on whether or not to opt out, then it can be
shown that no consumer would opt out in equilibrium, for any c > 0, which is neither realistic nor interesting.
6Technically, the strategy should also specify what the ﬁrm would have charged in the second period if it had
made a diﬀerent pricing decision in the ﬁrst period, but we omit this for notational simplicity.
6Figure 1: Timeline of the game.
f0;1g as a function of p1 and vi, and second-period purchasing decision qi
2 as a function of7
vi and pr
2); and the ﬁrm’s beliefs about consumers’ valuations given their identiﬁcation status
(F1 and F0 for identiﬁed and anonymous consumers, respectively8). These constitute a PBE if
all strategies are sequentially rational given the beliefs and the beliefs are consistent given the
strategies.
We assume that p1   Fp is concave, i.e., the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue in a single period
game is decreasing in p (or  2fp   pf0p  0); and that marginal revenue is concave (or
 3f0p   f00pp  0). We denote the ﬁrm’s optimal price in a one-shot version of the game
by p?, i.e., p?  argmaxp p1   Fp.
3 Benchmarks
3.1 No recognition
First, consider as a benchmark the case where there is no consumer recognition, so that the
ﬁrm cannot price discriminate in the second period between consumers that bought and did
not buy in the ﬁrst period. Since the ﬁrm does not price discriminate based on purchasing
history, a consumer will buy the good in each period in which his valuation exceeds the price.
Thus, the ﬁrm sets the same price in each period, p?  argmaxp p1 Fp, generating a per-




Consider now the opposite extreme in which the ﬁrm is able to recognize its previous cus-
tomers and consumers are unable to maintain their anonymity at any cost (as in Hart and
7In principle, the second-period decision can also directly depend on the ﬁrst-period price, but in equilibrium
it will only depend on vi and pr
2.
8The ﬁrm will also have beliefs about what actions an anonymous agent took in the ﬁrst period (did the agent
purchase and opt out or not purchase at all), but this will not aﬀect the analysis.
7Tirole (1988), Schmidt (1993), Villas-Boas (2004), Taylor (2004), and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas
(2006)). In this setting, the ﬁrm can discriminate between two diﬀerent groups of consumers
in the second period: identiﬁed consumers who purchased in the ﬁrst period, and unidentiﬁed
consumers who did not. The ﬁrm consequently sets two diﬀerent prices in the second period,
p1
2 to identiﬁed consumers and p0
2 to unidentiﬁed consumers. (We emphasize again that the
ﬁrm has no commitment power.)
Proposition 1 (Fudenberg & Villas-Boas 2006). In the full-recognition equilibrium, for some ˜ v,
(i) Consumers with valuations v 2 ˜ v;1 purchase in both periods; consumers with valuations
v 2 p0
2; ˜ v purchase only in the second period. The cutoﬀ type ˜ v satisﬁes ˜ v  p?.
(ii) The ﬁrm sets p1
2  ˜ v, while p0










and p1  ˜ v1     p0
2, respectively.
Let us consider the monopolist’s pricing strategy towards identiﬁed consumers in the sec-
ond period. If the cutoﬀ type for identiﬁed consumers (those who purchase in the ﬁrst period)
˜ v satisﬁes ˜ v  p?, then the monopolist sets p1
2  ˜ v. If, on the other hand, ˜ v < p?, the
monopolist sets p1
2  p?. That is, p1
2  maxf˜ v;p?g. From Proposition 1, since ˜ v  p? holds
on the path of play of the full-recognition equilibrium, p1
2  maxf˜ v;p?g  ˜ v. Hence, the
marginal consumer who buys in the ﬁrst period—the one with valuation ˜ v—gets no surplus in
the second period. This is the ratchet eﬀect of consumers who reveal their types (Freixas et al.,
1985; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1988). The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.
Paradoxically, the full-recognition case can result in higher consumer surplus than the no-
recognition case, because the ﬁrm will need to set p1 lower to attract consumers in the ﬁrst
period. Correspondingly, in the model with opting out, we will show that a low cost of opt-
ing out can lead to a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation where consumers maintain anonymity but
collectively suﬀer as a result, in comparison to the situation where anonymity is prohibitively
costly and consumers face the ratchet eﬀect.
By deﬁnition, a consumer with valuation ˜ v is indiﬀerent between purchasing in both pe-
riods and purchasing only in the second period. It follows that the indiﬀerence condition
that characterizes ˜ v is given by ˜ v   p1  ˜ v   p0
2. Hence, p1  ˜ v   ˜ v   p0
2. Using
p1  ˜ v  ˜ v  p0
2 and p1
2  ˜ v, one can simplify the ﬁrm’s present discounted proﬁt to obtain
˜ v1   F˜ v  p0
21   Fp0
2
8For  > 0, since p? uniquely maximizes p1   Fp and ˜ v  p?, we have
1  p?1   Fp?  ˜ v1   F˜ v  p0
21   Fp0
2
We thus have the following result.
Lemma 1. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt under full recognition is lower than its proﬁt under no recognition.
The intuition is that some consumers refrain from purchasing in the ﬁrst period because
they anticipate a lower price in the next as a result, and the ﬁrm is unable to fully recoup the
loss in ﬁrst-period proﬁt by price discriminating in the second period. Hart and Tirole (1988)
and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) show that if the ﬁrm is able to commit to second-period
prices in the ﬁrst period, it would set p1
2  p0
2  p?, a result which our Proposition 6 below
extends to the general model where consumers can opt out. Hence, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt under
commitment coincides with its proﬁt in the no-recognition equilibrium.
4 Opting out and partial recognition
We now consider the setting in which consumers who purchase in the ﬁrst period can opt out
and preserve anonymity at a cost of c. Consumers who purchase in the ﬁrst period and do not
opt out are identiﬁed by the ﬁrm in the second period (the ﬁrm recognizes that they purchased
at a price p1 and did not opt out) and will be oﬀered price p1
2 in period 2. All other consumers
are oﬀered p0
2 in period 2. As above, let ˜ v denote the lowest consumer type to purchase in the
ﬁrst period. We note that, given that a consumer with valuation ˜ v prefers to buy in the ﬁrst
period, i.e., ˜ v   p1  maxf˜ v   p1
2; ˜ v   p0
2   c;0g  maxf˜ v   p0
2;0g, then all consumers with
valuations v  ˜ v do as well. Denote by v the probability that a consumer of type v 2 ˜ v;1
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˜ v xfxdx if v > ˜ v
and the distribution of valuations among identiﬁable consumers (for v  ˜ v) is given by
F1v 
R v
˜ v 1   xfxdx
R 1
˜ v1   xfxdx
where F1v  0 if v < ˜ v.
94.1 Costless anonymity: equilibrium characterization
As a starting point, we ﬁrst consider the case where c  0. Here, we show that the equilibrium
is eﬀectively unique and corresponds to the no-recognition benchmark.
Proposition 2. When anonymity is costless (c  0), every9 PBE satisﬁes (and a PBE exists that
satisﬁes):
(i) The ﬁrm sets p1  p0
2  p? and p1
2  p?.
(ii) Consumers with valuations v 2 p?;1 purchase in both periods and opt out.
(iii) The no-recognition benchmark outcome is obtained.
Proof: For any p1, since it is costless to opt out, all consumers with valuations v  p1 will
purchase the good in the ﬁrst period. If p1
2 < p0
2, no purchasing consumers will opt out. In
this case, however, since the ﬁrm sets period 2 prices after consumers decide whether or not
to maintain their anonymity, p1
2 targets identiﬁed consumers in v;1, where v  p1 (some
range of additional consumers v;p1 will decide to purchase in the ﬁrst period in order to
obtain the discount in the second period). On the other hand, p0
2 targets the anonymous
consumers in 0;v (and there will be at least some consumers in this interval, because f is
positive on 0;1). Hence, setting p1
2 < p0




Since consumers anticipate that p1
2  p0
2, it is a best response for consumers who pur-
chased in the ﬁrst period to opt out. We now show that there is a PBE where all of them
use this best response; moreover, we characterize all the PBEs in which this is the case. If
all of them opt out, then all consumers are anonymous in the second period, and the ﬁrm
sets p0
2  p? to maximize period 2 proﬁt. Moreover, given that in the second period ev-
eryone will be anonymous, only consumers with valuations v 2 p1;1 purchase in the ﬁrst
period, so that ˜ v  p1. Hence, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem is to choose p1 to maximize
1   Fp1p1  1   Fp?p?, which results in p1  p?. Since no consumer is identiﬁed in
period 2, the ﬁrm’s beliefs about identiﬁed consumers’ valuations are oﬀ equilibrium. Consis-
tent oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs here are, for example, for the ﬁrm to believe identiﬁed consumers’
valuations to be at least ˜ v  p1  p?, so that setting p1
2  p? is a best response.
Now, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are equilibria in which some con-
sumers do not opt out on the path of play. For this to be the case in equilibrium, since
p1
2  p0
2, we must have p1
2  p0
2, otherwise no consumer would choose to stay identiﬁed. Let
p1
2  p0
2  ˜ p. First, we will show ˜ p  p?. For the sake of contradiction, suppose not, that is
9This is excluding the possibility of a PBE in which a measure zero subset of the consumers uses a diﬀerent
strategy.
10˜ p  p?. Then in period 2, only consumers with valuations in ˜ p;1 purchase, and the ﬁrm’s
period 2 proﬁt is given by ˜ p1   F˜ p. However, if the ﬁrm sets p1
2  p0
2  p? in the sec-
ond period, consumers with valuations in p?;1 would buy, resulting in period 2 proﬁt of
p?1   Fp? — which is strictly higher since p? uniquely maximizes p1   Fp. Hence,
p1
2  p0
2  p? holds in this case, and the ﬁrm’s period 2 proﬁt is given by p?1   Fp? for
any p1. Thus, it is proﬁt maximizing for the ﬁrm to set p1  p0
2  p1
2  p?.
Assume now that some positive mass of consumers who purchased in period 1 stays iden-
tiﬁed. Let G denote the (un-normalized) distribution of anonymous consumers in period 2,
so that
R 1
0 dGp < 1. Gp coincides with Fp up to p  p? because identiﬁed consumers
can only be in p1;1  p?;1. Thus, Fp?  Gp?. Let g p?  limp!p? dGp=dp.
g p? exists and satisﬁes g p?  fp? because F is twice diﬀerentiable.10 In period
2, the ﬁrm sets prices optimally to each group of consumers, and from our above observa-
tions, this has to result in p0
2  p? in a PBE. Since p1   Fp is concave, the ﬁrst-order
condition that gives p? is 1   Fp?   p?fp?  0. However, the ﬁrst-order condition of
the ﬁrm’s problem in pricing towards anonymous consumers, evaluated at p0




0 dGp Fp? p?fp? < 0 since
R 1
0 dGp < 1. Hence,
for some  > 0, the seller is better oﬀ setting p0
2  p?    than setting p0
2  p?, resulting in
the desired contradiction.
This result says that if the cost of maintaining anonymity is nil, then it is in the best interest
of every individual who purchases the good in the ﬁrst period to maintain her anonymity,
eﬀectively resulting in the no-recognition outcome from Subsection 3.1. However, as indicated
in Subsection 3.2, this turns out to be exactly what the ﬁrm wants.
From the perspective of consumers, in Subsection 4.4, we show that this outcome is a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma situation: individually, each consumer chooses to maintain her anonymity; as
a result, however, consumer surplus ends up being lower due to there being no price discrim-
ination. In fact, relative to the case where anonymity is costly, every consumer ends up being
(weakly) worse oﬀ overall when there is no cost associated with opting out. In other words, by
opting out, consumers impose a negative externality on other consumers. Below we study how
ﬁrm proﬁt and consumer surplus are aﬀected by the cost c of maintaining anonymity.
4.2 Costly anonymity: equilibrium characterization
We now move on to the general case in which there is some cost c  0. We will restrict
our attention to PBEs in which the following holds: all consumers who purchase the good
10We note that if f is discontinuous, then PBEs in which some consumers stay identiﬁed do exist.
11in the ﬁrst period opt out with the same probability  (alternatively,  can be thought of as
the proportion of consumers who opt out). This restriction is motivated by the fact that all
consumers who purchased in the ﬁrst period face the same tradeoﬀ when deciding to opt out:
either pay p1
2, or pay p0
2 c. (In equilibrium, all ﬁrst-period buyers will buy again in the second
period.) We refer to such an equilibrium as a pooling equilibrium.11
The ﬁrm’s second-period beliefs over valuations in a pooling equilibrium are given by
F0v 
8
> > > <
> > > :
Fv
F˜ v1 F˜ v if v  ˜ v
F˜ vFv F˜ v





> > > <
> > > :
0 if v  ˜ v
Fv F˜ v
1 F˜ v if v > ˜ v
(2)






2 for r  0;1 (3)
The following lemma shows that when c > 0, there does not exist a PBE in which all of the
consumers who purchased in the ﬁrst period opt out. The intuition is that when c > 0, it is
optimal for the ﬁrm to lower the ﬁrst-period price in order to attract more customers in the
ﬁrst period. For some of these customers, opting out is not a best response unless some other
consumers purchase and stay identiﬁed.
Lemma 2. For c > 0, there does not exist a PBE in which all ﬁrst-period customers opt out.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that there exists an equilibrium in which all consumers opt
out. Since all consumers are anonymous in the second period, the seller sets p0
2  p?. Since
consumers must ﬁnd opting out to be a best response, we have p1
2  p0
2  c  p?  c; in
addition, we have ˜ v  p?  c, else, a positive mass of consumers would not purchase in the
11The restriction to pooling equilibria can also be justiﬁed using a puriﬁcation argument. Suppose that, instead
of all agents facing the same cost of opting out, each agent’s opt-out cost is drawn from a commonly known
distribution. Furthermore suppose these costs are drawn i.i.d. across agents, and are independent of the agent’s
valuation. Let di, i 2 N, denote a sequence of continuous distributions over the opt-out cost that an individual
agent faces such that limi!1 di is the degenerate distribution on c (where c is the cost in the original game G). Let
Gdi denote the cost-perturbed game where each consumer’s cost of opting out is realized after the ﬁrst-period
purchasing decisions according to di. It can be shown that the pooling equilibrium we characterize is the unique
equilibrium that results from taking the limit of the equilibria of Gdi when i ! 1.
12second period and thus would not opt out. The resulting second-period proﬁt for the ﬁrm is
p?1   Fp?.
The indiﬀerence condition for the cutoﬀ type ˜ v is thus given by ˜ v   p1  ˜ v   c   p? 
˜ v   p?, which gives p1  ˜ v   c. Combined with ˜ v  p?  c, we have p1  p?  1   c.
The ﬁrm sets p1 to maximize present-discounted proﬁts, given by 1   Fp1  cp1 
p?1   Fp?. The ﬁrst-order condition gives p1 
1 Fp1c
fp1c . From concavity,
1 Fp
fp is






fp?  p?, a contradiction.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is rooted in the commitment problem of the seller. The seller
is unable to directly commit not to price discriminate in the second period, but is able to
inﬂuence consumers’ decisions to become anonymous in the second period by raising the
ﬁrst-period price. However, doing so results in a loss of proﬁt, both due to not capturing the
cost consumers expend on opting out and due to lower revenues in the ﬁrst period. Hence,
the seller ends up choosing to set a lower ﬁrst-period price and not all consumers opt out.
The next lemma provides a useful ordering of the equilibrium prices and cutoﬀ type, and
proves that anonymous consumers pay a discounted price in the second period. The key
drivers for the result are the seller’s inability to commit to second-period prices and con-
sumers’ strategic prediction of future prices in the ﬁrst period.
Lemma 3. For c > 0, if ˜ v  p?, then p0
2  p1  ˜ v  p1
2 holds on the path of play of a pooling
equilibrium.
Proof: From Lemma 2,  < 1, i.e., some consumers do not opt out and stay identiﬁed. From
the seller’s second period maximization problem it then follows that p1
2  maxfp?; ˜ vg  ˜ v.
The seller’s second period prices p1
2 and p0
2 both target the range of consumers in ˜ v;1
(technically, this holds for p0
2 only when  > 0). However, p0
2 also targets consumers in
0; ˜ v (for any ). It directly follows from the seller’s maximization problem (3) that p0
2  p1
2.
Moreover, since consumers anticipate in the ﬁrst period that p0
2  p1
2, no consumer would
purchase in the ﬁrst period if the price p1 exceeds her valuation. Thus, p1  ˜ v.
Now, assume on the contrary that p0
2 > p1 is part of an equilibrium; then no consumer
skips purchasing in the ﬁrst period to purchase in the second (in other words, there is no
point to delaying a purchase in hopes of a cheaper price). Consequently, all consumers with
valuations v  p1 purchase in the ﬁrst period, giving ˜ v  p1. It follows that p0
2 > ˜ v. But since
p1
2  ˜ v, we have p0
2 > ˜ v  p1
2, a contradiction.
The following proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium for suﬃciently small val-
ues of the cost of opting out, c. (Proposition 4, which follows, gives the relevant range on
13c.)
Proposition 3 (Pooling equilibrium). For suﬃciently small c > 0, every pooling equilibrium
satisﬁes:
(i) Consumers with valuations v 2 ˜ v;1 purchase in both periods and maintain anonymity with
probability ; consumers with valuations v 2 ˜ v  c; ˜ v purchase only in the second period; and
˜ v  p?.
(ii) Prices satisfy p1  ˜ v   c, p1
2  ˜ v, and p0
2  ˜ v   c. The ﬁrm’s beliefs about anonymous and
identiﬁed consumers’ valuations are given by (1) and (2).
(iii) For hv  Fv  vfv and h0v  2fv  vf0v, the cutoﬀ type ˜ v and opting out
probability  are determined from:
˜ v  c 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
 




h˜ v   c   F˜ v
1   F˜ v
(5)
Excluding deviations of measure 0, Proposition 3 uniquely determines the behavior on the
path of play. The resulting equilibrium, with prices p1  ˜ v   c, p0
2  ˜ v   c, and p1
2  ˜ v, has
the following properties. A consumer with valuation at least ˜ v will purchase in the ﬁrst period
as well as in the second period, and be indiﬀerent between opting out and staying identiﬁed.
A consumer with valuation ˜ v will be indiﬀerent among only buying in the ﬁrst period, only
buying in the second period, and buying in both periods. A consumer with valuation at most
˜ v will not purchase in the ﬁrst period, and purchase in the second period if and only if her
valuation is at least ˜ v   c. Essentially, the ﬁrm oﬀers anonymous customers “introductory”
prices in each period (though the introductory price is more attractive in the second period).
We now move on to general values of c (not necessarily small). Let c denote the proba-
bility that a consumer who purchased in the ﬁrst period maintains anonymity, when the cost
of doing so is c. (In a pooling equilibrium, by deﬁnition, this probability is the same for all




2 denote the second period





We proceed with several lemmas that address higher level of costs, which we then integrate
to give a more general characterization of equilibrium. The ﬁrst lemma addresses the case
where the cost of opting out is high.
Lemma 4. For c  ¯ c, the outcome from any pooling equilibrium coincides with the full-recognition
benchmark outcome.
14The intuition for this result is the following. For high costs of opting out, the full-recognition
benchmark outcome is obtainable by the ﬁrm. In fact, the ﬁrm’s problem is a constrained
version of its counterpart in the full-recognition benchmark, where its optimal strategy and
corresponding outcome in the latter is feasible. In essence, since the cost of opting out is
high, the availability of opting out does little to help the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in terms of encouraging
more consumers to purchase in the ﬁrst period, but more to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt by failing
to capture a signiﬁcant part of the cost anonymizing consumers incur. Consequently, the ﬁrm
sets prices that encourage consumers to stay identiﬁed in equilibrium.
The next lemma addresses the region of cost where consumers no longer opt out.
Lemma 5. Let ˆ c denote the smallest cost such that ˆ c  0. Then ˆ c < ¯ c.
The intuition for Lemma 5 relates to that of Lemma 4. In particular, the ﬁrm works to miti-
gate its loss of potential proﬁt from consumers anonymizing by reducing consumers’ incentive
to opt out. According to Lemma 5, the ﬁrm begins to do so for costs smaller than ¯ c.
The following Lemma shows that indeed no consumer opts out in equilibrium for all c  ˆ c.
Lemma 6. For all c  ˆ c, c  0.
The intuition for this result is that the ﬁrm maintains the status quo in terms of opting
out once it is able to eliminate consumers’ incentives to do so at ˆ c. The ﬁrm achieves this by
setting a ﬁrst-period price that is suﬃciently low (with a corresponding cutoﬀ type ˜ v that is
also suﬃciently low).
Proposition 4 characterizes the pooling equilibrium across diﬀerent values of c.




2 denote the full-recognition benchmark period 2 prices, and




2 . A pooling equilibrium exists, and any pooling equilibrium satisﬁes the
following properties on the path of play:
1. There exists ˆ c 2 0; ¯ c such that c > 0 for all c 2 0; ˆ c and c  0 for all c  ˆ c.
2. For c  0, the unique pooling equilibrium outcome coincides with the no-recognition equi-
librium outcome and is characterized by Proposition 2.
3. For c 2 0; ˆ c, the unique pooling equilibrium outcome is characterized by Proposition 3.
4. For c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, let ¯ v be deﬁned by F¯ v   c  ¯ v   cf¯ v   c  F¯ v. Then ˜ v is non-
decreasing in c on this region, with ˜ vˆ c < ˜ v¯ c, and maximizes ˜ v1   F˜ v1   
p0
2F˜ v   Fp0
2, subject to ˜ v  ¯ v, Fp0
2  fp0
2p0
2  F˜ v, and p1  1   ˜ v   p0
2.
155. For c  ¯ c, the outcome from any pooling equilibrium coincides with the full-recognition
benchmark outcome.
Figure 2 shows how the probability of opting out is aﬀected by the cost of maintaining
anonymity, c. The region ˆ c; ¯ c is of particular interest: as we will show shortly, consumer
and social surplus (weakly) decrease in this region, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt (weakly) increases, but
the probability of opting out is ﬁxed at 0. The various regions can be explained as follows.
Figure 2: Equilibrium probability  of opting out as a function of the cost of opting out, c, on the path of play.
First, the ﬁrm loses proﬁt when consumers opt out. When a consumer chooses to opt out,
because the ﬁrm’s second-period price for anonymous consumers is c lower than for identi-
ﬁed consumers (to keep consumers indiﬀerent between opting out and staying identiﬁed), this
eﬀectively costs the ﬁrm c. That is, the cost of opting out is passed on to the ﬁrm. Second,
since some consumers opt out, the second-period price to anonymous consumers, p0
2, targets
both ﬁrst-time buyers and repeat customers who opted out. Hence, (anonymous) repeat cus-
tomers are interfering with the ﬁrm’s ability to capture more ﬁrst-time buyers in the second
period, lowering the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. On the other hand, because consumers can opt out, more
consumers decide to buy in the ﬁrst period, which helps the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. This latter eﬀect
dominates when c is low, but is overcome by the former two eﬀects as c grows larger – to the
point (at c  ˆ c) where it pays oﬀ for the ﬁrm to lower the ﬁrst price suﬃciently so that no
consumer opts out. Once the cost reaches ˆ c, nobody will opt out, allowing the ﬁrm to more
easily price-discriminate as c increases.
The next proposition addresses the interval of opting out cost ˆ c; ¯ c as it pertains to wel-
fare. Recall that ˆ c is deﬁned as the smallest cost such that the purchasing consumers’ proba-
bility of opting out is 0 (i.e., the smallest c such that c  0); ¯ c is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
in second-period prices in the full-recognition benchmark.
Proposition 5. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is non-decreasing in c over ˆ c; ¯ c and is strictly higher for c  ¯ c
than at ˆ c. Consumer and social surplus are non-increasing over ˆ c; ¯ c and are strictly lower at
c  ¯ c than at ˆ c.
This result is striking for two reasons. First, it leads to the observation that the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt is non-monotonic in the cost of opting out, as we illustrate in the following subsection.
16Second, it shows that consumers can actually be worse oﬀ as the cost of opting out increases.
In other words, facilitating opting out can actually improve consumers’ welfare. This ﬁnding
extends the previous literature, which ﬁnds that strategic consumers are better oﬀ under full-
recognition compared to no-recognition. The above result brings forth the observation that
although consumers may not opt out in some region of cost (i.e., full recognition takes place),
they could still be better oﬀ when opting out is more accessible, even if they choose not to opt
out. Said another way, there are diﬀerent shades of “full recognition,” and as far as consumers
(and overall welfare) are concerned, some are better than others — namely the ones where
opting out is more accessible. We further illustrate this ﬁnding in Subsection 4.4.
4.3 Firm profit
For c 2 0; ˆ c and for c  ¯ c, the ﬁrm’s present-discounted proﬁt is given by
˜ vc   cc1   F˜ vc  p0
21   Fp0
2 (6)
By Proposition 5, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt for c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c is lower than at c  ¯ c.12
At c  0, the ﬁrm obtains the no-recognition benchmark proﬁt (where all consumers opt
out), given by 1  p?1   Fp?. Lemma 1 showed that this proﬁt exceeds the one in
the full-recognition benchmark (with no opting out). Consequently, it is also greater than the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt for any opting out cost c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c.
The above indicates that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is non-monotonic in the cost of opting out: It
is higher at c  0 than at either ˆ c or ¯ c, but lower at ˆ c than at ¯ c. We also recall that in the
full-recognition benchmark, if the ﬁrm is able to commit, then the outcome coincides with the
no-recognition benchmark. It turns out that this remains true in the model with (costly) opting
out. The following proposition proves this and summarizes the above observations.
Proposition 6 (Firm proﬁt). The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is highest at c  0 and is non-monotonic in c. If




Proof: For a given cost of opting out, c, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt cannot exceed its proﬁt when it collects
this c from consumers who opt out (this is a hypothetical situation). This proﬁt is found by
adding cc1   F˜ v (the present-discounted amount consumers spend on opting out) to
12We note that for all c  ¯ c, the ﬁrm obtains the full-recognition equilibrium proﬁt.
17the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in (6). Then, an upper bound on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by:13
˜ vc1   F˜ vc  p0
21   Fp0
2 (7)
The expression in (7) is uniquely maximized when ˜ vc  p0
2  p?, which gives the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt in the no-recognition benchmark, also obtained, by Proposition 2, when c  0. However,
Proposition 4 proves that ˜ v > p? for all c > 0. Thus, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is higher under c  0
than under any c > 0.
Claim: If the ﬁrm were able to commit to second-period prices, it would set p0
2 and p1
2 such
that no positive mass of consumers opts out.
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that some mass of consumers opts out in equilibrium when
the ﬁrm commits to second-period prices. For opting out to beneﬁt some consumers, we have
p1
2   p0
2  c. We now show that this leads to a contradiction:
1. First, consider the case where p1
2   p0
2 > c. In this case, all purchasing consumers opt
out. Then, the ﬁrm possesses the following proﬁtable deviation: hold p0
2 constant and
reduce p1
2 to anywhere in p0
2;p0
2 c, because (i) no consumer would opt out, (ii) at least
as many consumers purchase since prices were only reduced, and (iii) repeat consumers
now pay strictly more in the second period.
2. Let us now direct attention to the case where p1
2   p0
2  c. Without loss of generality,
suppose there is a mass m of repeat consumers, a proportion  > 0 of which decides to
opt out. Consider the following deviation: decrease p1
2 by . By doing so, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
gains mc    and loses 1   m. As  ! 0, this deviation is proﬁtable.
Any outcome that the ﬁrm can achieve with prices where no consumer opts out is of course
also feasible in the commitment version of the full-recognition game. Thus, the ﬁrm’s commit-
ment problem in the partial-recognition game is a constrained version of the ﬁrm’s commit-
ment problem in the full-recognition game (with p1
2 p0
2  c as an added constraint). Moreover,
the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy and corresponding outcome in the unconstrained problem (setting
p1  p0
2  p1
2  p?, with consumers in p?;1 purchasing in both periods without opting out)
is feasible in the constrained problem. The result follows.
13For c 2 0; ˆ c, this proﬁt is given by (7). For c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, this proﬁt is bounded above by the proﬁt under c  ¯ c,
which is given by (7). For c > ¯ c, proﬁt is the same as under c  ¯ c. Hence, the proﬁt in (7) provides an upper
bound on proﬁt for any given c.
184.4 Do consumers benefit from more privacy?
We now turn to consumer surplus. Proposition 6 shows that the ﬁrm obtains its highest proﬁt
when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity. However, this does not immediately
imply that consumer surplus is at its lowest in this case, because the total surplus may vary
depending on the cost of opting out. Speciﬁcally, since there is no cost to production, the
eﬃcient outcome in this model – the ﬁrst best – would be for every consumer to obtain the
good in each period. Hence, the eﬃcient outcome is not obtained for any c  0, since some
consumers do not purchase.
For c 2 0; ˆ c and c  ¯ c, consumer surplus is given by14
Z 1
˜ v











In (8), ? is consumer surplus from ﬁrst period transactions: consumers with valuations
v 2 ˜ v;1 purchase the good and pay a price p1  ˜ v   c; ?? is consumer surplus from
period 2 transactions: consumers with valuations v 2 ˜ v;1 are repeat customers and end up
expending ˜ v (factoring in the cost of opting out), and consumers with valuations v 2 ˜ v c; ˜ v
are ﬁrst-time customers who receive a price discount of c.
When valuations are uniformly distributed, Proposition 4 can be used to derive equilibrium
ﬁrm proﬁt and consumer surplus as a function of the cost of opting out c . In particular, we
have ˆ c 
1
43, and ¯ c 
2
82; consumers with v 2 ˜ v;1 purchase in the ﬁrst period and opt






21  c if c  ˆ c







11 c if c  ˆ c
0 if c > ˆ c;
(10)






21 if c  ˆ c
minf2   c;2   ¯ cg if c > ˆ c;
(11)
14The expression in (8), evaluated at c  ¯ c, gives a lower bound on consumer surplus for c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, by
Proposition 5. Consumer surplus for c  ¯ c equals consumer surplus at c  ¯ c, since the equilibrium outcome is
unchanged.
19Second-period prices satisfy p0
2 
1
2˜ v  1   ˜ v, and p1
2  ˜ v. The ﬁrm’s beliefs about
anonymous and identiﬁed consumers’ valuations are given by (1) and (2).
Figures 3(a)-(d) show comparative statics for the case of   1. In Proposition 7 below as
well as in Figure 3, we also study social surplus, which can be interpreted in two diﬀerent
ways, depending on whether the cost of opting out is deadweight loss, or collected as a fee
by a third party (for example, one can rent an anonymous postal box for a fee). In the former
case, social surplus equals ﬁrm proﬁt plus consumer surplus; in the latter, social surplus is
higher than this sum if consumers opt out at positive costs.
Proposition 7. With uniformly distributed valuations, the following properties are satisﬁed:
 Consumer surplus is non-monotonic in c, increasing in c over 0; ˆ c, decreasing over ˆ c; ¯ c,
higher for c  ˆ c than at c  0, and highest at ˆ c.





45; ¯ c, and highest at c  0.
 When the cost of opting out is deadweight loss, social surplus is non-monotonic in c, de-
creasing in c over 0;
1
1211, increasing over 
1
1211; ˆ c, decreasing over ˆ c; ¯ c, higher
for c  ˆ c (where no consumer opts out) than at c  0 (all purchasing consumers opt out),
and highest at ˆ c.
 When the cost of opting out is not wasted, social surplus is non-monotonic in c, increasing
in c over 0; ˆ c, decreasing over ˆ c; ¯ c, higher for c  ˆ c than at c  0, and highest at ˆ c.
The intuition is as follows: when c  0, all consumers who purchase in the ﬁrst period
choose to maintain their anonymity. As c begins to rise, consumers must pay a non-trivial
cost in order to opt out. The ﬁrm resorts to reducing the ﬁrst-period price to counteract the
negative eﬀect on consumers’ buying incentives: consumers are reluctant to purchase in the
ﬁrst period because of the cost they will incur in the second period either from opting out or
from paying a high price. This results in a lower proﬁt for the ﬁrm than it would have had
with a lower c, but in higher consumer surplus. In the case where c is deadweight loss, this
also results in lower social surplus because many consumers opt out in this region of cost.
As c approaches ˆ c, fewer consumers opt out. This gives the ﬁrm more ﬂexibility in setting
second-period prices, allowing it to better price discriminate which leads to a slight increase
in proﬁt. The ﬁrm continues to depress the ﬁrst-period price over this range; additionally,
better price discrimination allows the ﬁrm to target more low valuation consumers in the
second period. This results in higher consumer surplus. Hence, as c approaches ˆ c, both proﬁt
20(a) Firm proﬁt as a function of c (b) Consumer surplus as a function of c
(c) Social surplus, c is deadweight loss (d) Social surplus, c is a fee
Figure 3: Comparative statics when valuations are uniformly distributed and   1.
and consumer surplus are increasing so that social surplus is increasing when the cost c is
wasted. When it is not wasted, social surplus is increasing but not as steeply because there is
no surplus recovered directly from fewer consumers anonymizing (we recall that in this case,
social surplus equals the sum of proﬁt, consumer surplus, and the total cost of opting out).
When c is in ˆ c; ¯ c, no consumer opts out. The ﬁrm increases prices in this range in order to
better price discriminate in the second period, which results in fewer consumers purchasing
and lower surplus overall.
The following proposition addresses the surplus of an individual consumer when valua-
tions are uniformly distributed, after the consumer learns her valuation for the good.
Proposition 8. With uniformly distributed valuations, each consumer is individually (weakly)
better oﬀ under c > 0 than at c  0.
Proof: When c  0, only consumers with types in p?;1 (or in 
1
2;1, using p? 
1
2) purchase
in both periods. We proceed in several steps.
(i) We ﬁrst study the welfare of a consumer i with valuation vi 2 ˜ vc;1 for some c > 0.
When opting out is costless, i’s present-discounted consumer surplus is given by 1˜ v 
1
2.
Under costly anonymity, i obtains vi   p1  vi   ˜ v. Note that we can rewrite i’s consumer
surplus as vi  ˜ v  ˜ v  p1vi  ˜ v, which, using p1  ˜ v  c, is equal to 1vi  ˜ vc.
Since vi 2 ˜ v;1, i’s consumer surplus is bounded below by c. Thus, consumer i is always
better oﬀ under costly anonymity if c > 1  ˜ v  
1
2.
21When c 2 0; ˆ c, we can simplify using ˜ v 
1 c12
21  c. The inequality reduces to
0 >  c
1
2, hence i is better oﬀ with c > 0 in this region. When c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, we can simplify
using ˜ v  2c. The inequality reduces to 0 > c2 
1
21. Since c  ¯ c 
2
82, the RHS is
bounded above by  
 
8, so that the inequality is indeed satisﬁed. Thus, i is better oﬀ under
c > 0 relative to c  0 (we note that consumers have the same welfare under c > ¯ c as at ¯ c,
thus considering the above two regions is suﬃcient).
(ii) We now consider a consumer i with valuation vi 2 p?; ˜ v. For a given c > 0, i will only
consider purchasing in the second period. When doing so, her surplus is given by vi   p0
2.
At c  0, i obtains 1  vi  
1








2  ˜ v  c, this holds if 0 > vi  
1
2 ˜ v  c
for all vi 2 p?; ˜ v. The expression on the RHS is bounded above by 1˜ v 
1
2 c, which,
as shown in (i), is indeed negative.
(iii) It remains to consider a consumer i with valuation vi  p?. Such a consumer is trivially
(weakly) better oﬀ under c > 0 than at c  0, since i obtains a payoﬀ of zero at c  0.
Proposition 8 clearly illustrates the Prisoner’s Dilemma nature of the outcome: when c  0,
individually, each consumer chooses to maintain her anonymity; however, every consumer
ends up being (weakly) worse oﬀ as as a result of there being no price discrimination. The
reason is that by opting out, consumers impose a negative externality on other consumers; a
non-zero cost of opting out serves to at least partially alleviate this eﬀect by diminishing the
incentive to opt out.
5 Conclusions and extensions
We studied a model in which a ﬁrm is able to recognize and price discriminate against its pre-
vious customers, while consumers can maintain their anonymity at some cost. We showed that
the ﬁrm obtains its highest proﬁt when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity,
but consumers can be better oﬀ when maintaining anonymity is costly, though only up to a
point.
This paper suggests that certain aspects of online consumer privacy may be misjudged
by policymakers and consumer advocacy groups. In particular, facilitating opting out can
decrease consumer and social surplus when the cost of opting out is already low, although
the opposite (or a neutral) eﬀect takes place at higher costs. Of course, in practice, many
other considerations need to be taken into account that are not in the scope of our model,
such as the intrinsic value of privacy, as well as the (possibly accidental) release of sensitive
22information and corresponding spillover eﬀects—for example, the release of an individual’s
medical records to her employer.
Our model can, in principle, be extended to take certain other economic considerations into
account. An obvious direction is to study a setting with competition. Indeed, we have some
initial ﬁndings in a similar model with two ﬁrms selling diﬀerentiated products; these ﬁndings
suggest that phenomena similar to those identiﬁed above continue to occur. Another direction
for further study is to make the cost of opting out endogenous. For example, one can consider
a setting where a third party—a privacy gatekeeper—can provide anonymity to consumers for
a fee.15 One of our preliminary ﬁndings in this extension of the model is that the privacy
gatekeeper would prefer to bargain with the ﬁrm and actually set the cost to consumers of
opting out to zero. One can also consider settings where consumers obtain some beneﬁt from
being identiﬁed, such as smaller search costs or better technical support. Our preliminary
ﬁnding here is that the results from the basic model carry through, except the relevant range
of costs grows larger.16 Another variant is to consider an opt-in policy. For instance, the
ﬁrm could pay consumers to be identiﬁed (as in the case of membership programs that oﬀer
discounts). Another direction is to increase consumer heterogeneity by, for instance, allowing
each consumer to have a diﬀerent cost for opting out. One can also enrich the model by
studying consumers with diminishing marginal utility for future units of the product. Finally,
it would be interesting to study the steady-state equilibrium of an inﬁnite-horizon version of
our model with overlapping generations of consumers.
There are, in fact, a multitude of questions concerning issues of online privacy that are both
interesting and potentially important. A primary message of this paper is that the answers to
such questions may not be as obvious as they ﬁrst appear. Indeed — as we have illustrated —
it is often necessary to parse carefully the underlying economic forces at work before one can
make correct policy recommendations.
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The game we analyze is isomorphic to one between a ﬁrm and a single consumer whose type
is distributed according to F, with one additional assumption: in the second period, the ﬁrm
cannot distinguish between the situation where the consumer did not purchase in the ﬁrst pe-
riod, and the situation where the consumer did purchase in the ﬁrst period and opted out. (For
example, the ﬁrm cannot check its inventory to ﬁnd out if a purchase was made. This assump-
tion is unnecessary when there is a continuum of consumers because the ﬁrm’s information
would not change if a single, massless consumer deviated.) Since the ﬁrm sets the ﬁrst-period
price when it only knows the prior distribution F, the game is unaﬀected if consumers realize
their types (according to the same F) after the ﬁrm sets p1; it will be conceptually easier to
think of p1 being set ﬁrst. This results in the extensive-form game shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Sketch of the extensive form of the isomorphic game.
26B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Let ˜ v denote the cutoﬀ type of the marginal consumer who purchases in the ﬁrst
period, and assume that ˜ v  p?. We will show that this is indeed satisﬁed on the path of play
in equilibrium.
The ﬁrm’s second-period problems towards identiﬁed and anonymous consumers are given
by p1
2  argmaxp˜ v p1 Fp and p0
2  argmaxp pF˜ v Fp, respectively. From concav-
ity of v1   Fv, it follows that p1




2  F˜ v.
Since we assume ˜ v  p?, we have p1
2  ˜ v. Thus, a consumer who purchases in the ﬁrst period
obtains zero payoﬀ in the second.
By deﬁnition, a consumer with valuation ˜ v is indiﬀerent between purchasing now and
later. Thus, ˜ v   p1  ˜ v   p0
2, and p1  ˜ v1     p0
2. Implicitly diﬀerentiating this
expression with respect to p1, we obtain @˜ v=@p1 1  @˜ v=@p1 p00
2 @˜ v=@p1. Thus, @˜ v=@p1 
1   1   p00
2  1 and equivalently, @p1=@˜ v  1   1   p00
2 
The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem is given by choosing p1 to maximize
p11   F˜ v  p1
21   Fp1
2  p0
2F˜ v   Fp0
2 (12)
where ˜ v is a function of p1, p1
2 and p0
2 are functions of ˜ v (and thus of p1). An alternative
approach that is technically simpler is for the ﬁrm’s to choose ˜ v to maximize (12), treating p1
as a function of ˜ v instead. Simplifying (12) using p1
2  ˜ v, the ﬁrm’s problem is then given by
setting ˜ v to maximize
p11   F˜ v  ˜ v1   F˜ v  p0
2F˜ v   Fp0
2
The ﬁrst-order condition gives
1   F˜ v   p1f˜ v   ˜ vf˜ v  p00
2 1   Fp0
2  p0
2f˜ v   fp0
2p00
2   0
Simplifying using p1  ˜ v1     p0
2, we have
1   F˜ v   ˜ vf˜ v  p00







2  F˜ v, we have
˜ v  1  p00
2 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
(13)
Assume on the contrary that ˜ v  p?. Since p? 
1 Fp?
fp? and ˜ v <
1 F˜ v
f˜ v for ˜ v < p?, it follows
from (13) that p00





2  F˜ v, it follows that p00
2 > 0, a contradiction. Thus, ˜ v > p?.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Assume ˜ v  p? holds on the path of play. By Lemma 2, p1
2  maxfp?; ˜ vg  ˜ v. (We
show below that ˜ v  p? is indeed satisﬁed.) From Lemma 3, the solution to the ﬁrm’s period
2 problem for anonymous consumers satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition of (3):
Fp0
2˜ v  fp0
2˜ vp0
2˜ v  F˜ v1      (14)
If  > 0, in order for consumers who mix between opting out and not opting out to be indif-
ferent, p0
2  c  p1
2 must hold. Since p1
2  ˜ v, we therefore have p0
2  ˜ v   c. Combining this
observation with (14), we obtain:
 
˜ v   cf˜ v   c  F˜ v   c   F˜ v
1   F˜ v
(15)
Substituting using hv  Fv  vfv in the above, we immediately obtain (5).
From p1
2  p0
2c  ˜ v, it follows that a consumer with valuation ˜ v obtains a payoﬀ of zero in
period 2. Moreover, since a consumer with valuation ˜ v is indiﬀerent between purchasing now
and possibly later and purchasing only later, she is overall indiﬀerent between purchasing only
now, purchasing only later, and purchasing now and later (with and without opting out). Since
this consumer receives zero payoﬀ in period 2, the following equality holds: ˜ v p1  ˜ v p0
2,
i.e., the consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing only in the ﬁrst period and only in the
second period. Substituting using p0
2  ˜ v   c, we obtain ˜ v  p1  c. Hence, if ˜ v  p?, the
ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem of choosing p1 is equivalent to choosing ˜ v such that p1  ˜ v c and
p0




1   F˜ vp1p1  
 
1   1   F˜ vp1˜ vp1




28Using the above observations, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem is reduced to
max
˜ v
˜ v   c1   F˜ v  ˜ v   c1   F˜ v   c (16)
Substituting for  using (15) in the above, we obtain
max
˜ v
˜ v1   F˜ v  ˜ v   c1   F˜ v   c   cF˜ v   c  ˜ v   cf˜ v   c   F˜ v
Letting hv  Fv  vfv and h0v  @hv=@v  2fv  vf 0v, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion is
1   F˜ v   f˜ v˜ v  1   h˜ v   c   ch0˜ v   c  cf˜ v  0 (17)
Rearranging (17), we obtain
c 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
 
1   h˜ v   c   ch0˜ v   c
f˜ v
  ˜ v  0 (18)
Given a suﬃciently small c, (18) can be used to solve for ˜ v (we recall  > 0 is assumed
throughout).
To show that ˜ v  p? is indeed satisﬁed, substitute ˜ v  p? into (17). Using the fact that
1 Fp? p?fp?  0 and dividing by  gives 1 hp?  c ch0p?  c fp?. First,
it is easy to see that this expression equals 0 when c  0, since hp?  1. Diﬀerentiating this
expression with respect to c gives fp?  ch00p?   c, or alternatively, fp?  c3f0p?  
c  p?   cf 00p?   c. Since 3f0v  vf00v is assumed non-negative for v 2 0;1
and fp? > 0, this derivative is positive. Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition in (18) evaluated at
˜ v  p? is nonnegative and strictly positive for c > 0. It follows that ˜ v  p?.
Rearranging (18) gives
1  1   h˜ v   c   ch0˜ v   c  ˜ v   cf˜ v  F˜ v (19)
By assumption, v1 Fv and its derivative are concave. It follows that the left-hand side of
(19) is decreasing in ˜ v while the right-hand side is increasing. Hence, a unique ˜ v satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition, giving a unique behavior in a pooling equilibrium on the path of play.
The ﬁrm’s problem is deﬁned over a compact interval, where proﬁt is not maximized at
neither boundary ˜ v  0 nor ˜ v  1. Moreover, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst and second-period problems are
well deﬁned given ˜ v  p? and the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem indeed satisﬁes ˜ v  p?. It
follows that a pooling equilibrium exists.
We note that equilibrium behavior oﬀ the path of play has not been speciﬁed. In the ﬁrst
29period, for instance, if the ﬁrm sets p1  0, there exists an equilibrium of the continuation
game in which all consumers buy. If no consumer opts out, the ﬁrm does not learn anything
about identiﬁed consumers. In this case, the ﬁrm sets p1
2  p?, while any p0
2  p? can
be sustained since beliefs about anonymous consumers are oﬀ path. Similarly, if p1 is set
suﬃciently high, as characterized in the proof of Lemma 2, it can be an equilibrium of the
oﬀ-path continuation game for all consumers to opt out.
In the second period, per Lemma 2, for all c > 0, there is a positive mass of both identiﬁed
and anonymous consumers on the path of play. Aside for the case of c  0, addressed in
Proposition 2, and the case of p1  p?  1   c, addressed in Lemma 2, there are no other
non-trivial17 oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs on the continuation game that follows the ﬁrst period.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: We have shown in Proposition 2 that the pooling equilibrium outcome coincides with
the no-recognition benchmark outcome when c  0. Let pFR
1 , p
0;FR
2 , and p
1;FR
2 denote the
ﬁrst and second-period prices in the full-recognition benchmark outcome, respectively. Let ˆ c





It is straightforward to see that in the model with opting out, given opting out cost ¯ c, the








2 , and ¯ c  0 are part of a pooling equilibrium.
Assume on the contrary the ﬁrm possesses a proﬁtable deviation by setting a diﬀerent
ﬁrst-period price, which would lead to a diﬀerent pooling equilibrium and give it higher proﬁt.
If the deviation maintains   0, it would have been possible in the full-recognition benchmark
— a contradiction. Thus,  > 0 must occur in this deviation. Since  > 0, we have p1
2   p0
2 
¯ c to satisfy indiﬀerence between opting out and not. However, then the same deviation is
possible in the full-recognition benchmark, only with no opting out, and thus a higher proﬁt,
contradicting the ﬁrm setting prices optimally.
An analogous argument can be made for any c > ¯ c. It follows that for any c  ¯ c, the pooling
equilibrium outcome coincides with the full-recognition benchmark outcome.
17There are oﬀ-path situations in which consumers behave in a non-utility maximizing way, but such individual
behavior does not aﬀect the prices oﬀered by the ﬁrm nor the ﬁrm’s beliefs. Similarly, oﬀ-path situations
following p1  1 (no consumer purchases in the ﬁrst period) or p1  0 (all consumers purchase in the ﬁrst
period) are obvious. These prices cannot be sustained in equilibrium: the ﬁrm possesses proﬁtable deviations in
the ﬁrst period by setting p1 2 0;1, strictly increasing its ﬁrst-period proﬁt, while it is still able to obtain the




30Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: From Lemma 4, it immediately follows that there exists ˆ c 2 0; ¯ c such that ˆ c  0.
Since ˆ c is the smallest cost at which no consumer opts out, the ﬁrst-order condition (hence-
forth FOC) of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem (4) is satisﬁed at ˆ c. We can then apply Proposition
3 to obtain p1
2   p0
2  ˜ v   p0
2  ˆ c.
We recall from (5) that
c 
F˜ vc   c  ˜ vc   cf˜ vc   c   F˜ vc
1   F˜ vc
(20)
From ˆ c  0, we have (where we henceforth use ˜ v in leu of ˜ vc to simplify expressions)
F˜ v   ˆ c  ˜ v   ˆ cf˜ v   ˆ c  F˜ v (21)




   
cˆ c

2f˜ v   ˆ c  ˜ v   ˆ cf0˜ v   ˆ c   f˜ v
1   F˜ v
(22)
We recall from (18) the (expanded) FOC of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem:
c 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
 
1   F˜ v   c   ˜ v   cf˜ v   c   2cf˜ v   c   c˜ v   cf 0˜ v   c
f˜ v
  ˜ v  0
Using (21) and simplifying, the above evaluated at ˆ c reduces to:
ˆ c 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
1     ˆ c
2f˜ v   ˆ c  ˜ v   ˆ cf 0˜ v   ˆ c   f˜ v  f˜ v
f˜ v
  ˜ v  0
where  f˜ v  f˜ v was added as a wash. We can now simplify further using (22) to obtain
˜ v 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
1  1   0ˆ cˆ c (23)
We now compare (23) with the corresponding FOC in the full-recognition benchmark to illus-
trate the relationship between ˆ c and ¯ c. The ﬁrm’s FOC in the full-recognition benchmark gives
˜ vFR 










2f˜ vFR   ¯ c  ˜ vFR   ¯ cf 0˜ vFR   ¯ c
(25)
Since the price p
0;FR
2 only targets consumers in 0; ˜ v¯ c and is set to maximize pF˜ v¯ c  
31Fp, it follows that p
0;FR
2 satisﬁes F˜ v¯ c  Fp
0;FR




2 . From concavity of
p1   Fp, we then have p
00;FR
2 < 1.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that ˆ c  ¯ c. Then ˜ vˆ c  ˜ vFR follows from Lemma 4.
For (23) and (24) to yield the same solution, it is required that p
00;FR
2  1 0ˆ cˆ c  1 0¯ c¯ c.
This holds if
f˜ v
2f˜ v   ¯ c  ˜ v   ¯ cf0˜ v   ¯ c
 1   ¯ c
2f˜ v   ¯ c  ˜ v   ¯ cf0˜ v   ¯ c   f˜ v
1   F˜ v
(26)
Let h0v   c  2f˜ v   ¯ c  ˜ v   ¯ cf0˜ v   ¯ c. Then the above expression reduces to:
f˜ v
h0˜ v   ¯ c
 1   ¯ c
h0˜ v   ¯ c   f˜ v
1   F˜ v
which further reduces to:
f˜ v  h0˜ v   ¯ c
In other words, ˆ c  ¯ c requires f˜ v  2f˜ v   ¯ c  ˜ v   ¯ cf0˜ v   ¯ c. If we substitute this back
in (25) we obtain p
00;FR
2  1, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: From (23), the ﬁrm’s FOC at ˆ c gives
˜ v 
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
1  1   0ˆ cˆ c
where 0  @=@˜ v. From (22), we also have
0ˆ c 
2f˜ v   ˆ c  f0˜ v   ˆ c˜ v   ˆ c
1   F˜ v
 
f˜ v
1   F˜ v
Substituting 0 into the above FOC and simplifying, we have
1   F˜ v
f˜ v
1  1  
2f˜ v   ˆ c  f0˜ v   ˆ c˜ v   ˆ c
1   F˜ v
ˆ c   ˜ v   ˆ c  0 (27)
For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some k0 2 ˆ c; ¯ c such that k0 > 0.
Since ¯ c  0, there must exist k > k0 such that k  0 and the ﬁrst-order condition (27) is
satisﬁed at c  k (i.e.,  turns 0 at k and Proposition 3 can be applied). From Proposition 3, we
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2k  ˜ vk k. Substituting this into the ﬁrm’s second-period problem, we obtain
˜ vk   kf˜ vk   k  F˜ vk   k  F˜ vk (28)
Due to concavity of p1   Fp, the latter expression together with (28) can both hold only if
˜ vk  ˜ vˆ c > k ˆ c. We thus have ˜ vk  ˜ vˆ c > k ˆ c  k ˆ c, so that ˜ vk k > ˜ vˆ c ˆ c.
Since k  0, the ﬁrst-order condition at k similarly gives:





1   F˜ vk   k
 
2f˜ vk   k  f0˜ vk   k˜ vk   k





 ˜ vk   k | {z }
?
(29)
To see that this expression is negative, we ﬁrst note that ? is lower (more negative) than
its corresponding term in (27). In addition, the hazard rate
1 Fv
v is decreasing, and since
˜ vk > ˜ vˆ c, 1   F˜ vk < 1   F˜ vˆ c.
It remains to show that ?? is smaller, but this follows directly from concavity of p1  
Fp and its derivative. Hence, the FOC is violated at c  k, a contradiction. It follows that
for all c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, c  0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Lemmas 4-6 prove parts (1) and (5). Proposition 2 proves part (2) and Proposition 3
proves part (3). It remains to prove part (4).
By Lemma 6, for c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, the equilibrium ﬁrst-period price p1 and corresponding cutoﬀ
type ˜ v are low enough to satisfy c  0. From the ﬁrm’s second-period problem, when
  0, p0
2 is derived from
Fp0
2˜ v  fp0
2˜ vp0
2˜ v  F˜ v (30)
Let ¯ vc satisfy
F¯ v   c  f¯ v   c¯ v   c  F¯ v (31)
From (5), we have
c 
F˜ vc   c  ˜ vc   cf˜ vc   c   F˜ vc
1   F˜ vc
Since c  0 holds on ˆ c; ¯ c], ¯ vc denotes the highest cutoﬀ type such that   0 in this
33region. The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period problem is given by
max
˜ vc
˜ vc1   F˜ vc1    p0
2˜ vcF˜ vc   Fp0
2˜ vc (32)
subject to ˜ vc  ¯ vc, i.e., subject to c  0. Since @¯ vc=@c > 0, the ﬁrm is less con-
strained as c increases, thus proﬁt is non-decreasing on ˆ c; ¯ c.
Assume on the contrary that ˜ v0c < 0 holds at some c1 2 ˆ c; ¯ c so that ¯ vc1   ˜ vc1  .
Let k < c1 satisfy ¯ vc1   ¯ vk  . Then the same strategy is feasible for the ﬁrm for all c 2
k;c1. Since the ﬁrm is less constrained as c increases in this region, and an optimal strategy
and corresponding outcome in a less constrained problem is feasible in a more constrained
problem, ˜ vc1 would indeed be optimal for c 2 k;c1. However, one can make a similar
argument for any c 2 c1; ¯ c. In particular, one can make a similar argument for c slightly
above c1. But then ˜ v0c1  0, a contradiction. Thus, ˜ v0c  0.
From the fact that both ˆ c and ¯ c satisfy F˜ v   c  f˜ v   c˜ v   c  F˜ v and ˆ c < ¯ c, we
have ˜ vˆ c < ˜ v¯ c. Thus, ˜ v0c > 0 holds for some c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: Following the proof of part (4) of Proposition 4, the ﬁrm’s constraint in this region of
cost is ˜ v  ¯ v. Because @¯ vc=@c > 0, the ﬁrm is less constrained as c increases (with the ﬁrm’s
objective and other constraints remaining the same). Thus, proﬁt is non-decreasing.
Since no consumer opts out for c 2 ˆ c; ¯ c, social surplus is simply a function of how many
consumers purchase in equilibrium. From part (4) of Proposition 4, ˜ vc is non-decreasing on
ˆ c; ¯ c and is strictly increasing for some c in this region. Combining this result with p1
2  ˜ v




2  F˜ v, where p1 Fp is concave, it follows
that in this region, p0
2 and p1
2 are non-decreasing in c and strictly increasing for some c. From
the indiﬀerence condition of type ˜ v, we also have ˜ v  p1  ˜ v  p0
2, or p1  ˜ v1 p0
2;
hence, p1 exhibits the same behavior as p0
2 and p1
2. Therefore, both consumer and social
surplus are non-increasing in c on this range and are strictly lower at ¯ c than at ˆ c.
34